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Judicial Notice and the California
Evidence Code
By THOmAS KONGSGAArD*
THE term "judicial notice" is not defined in the new California Evi-
dence Code, but it seems apparent that the term is used in its generally
accepted sense. Judicial notice in the orthodox sense signifies that there
are certain facta probanda, or propositions in a party's case, that are so
obvious and well known that no proof will be required; they will be
taken for true by the tribunal without the need of evidence.' This prac-
tice is based on the maxim that what is known need not be proved,
manifesta (or notoria) non indigent probatione, and has its roots far
back in the civil and canon law.2
The principal effect of the application of the doctrine of judicial
notice is to excuse a party having the burden of establishing a fact from
the necessity of producing formal proof of the fact by sworn witnesses
or by the use of authenticated documents. The California Supreme
Court has stated that "judicial notice is a judicial short-cut, a doing
away with the formal necessity for evidence because there is no real
necessity for it" 4
Under traditional notions, whenever a fact is to be proved by a
witness, the witness must be competent, must be sworn, must possess
knowledge, and must state his knowledge without infringing upon the
hearsay rule, the opinion rule, and other procedural rules that may
curtail his testimony. Similarly, if.a matter is to be proved by a docu-
ment, it must be authenticated and must escape the hearsay rule and
other restrictions connected with the reception of documentary evi-
dence.
When a court can invoke the doctrine of judicial notice it simply
declares its knowledge of the matter and thereby establishes it as a fact
without the time consuming formalities and limitations of traditional
proof of facts.
*B.S., 1946, University of California, LL.B., 1949, Stanford University. Superior
Court Judge, County of Napa.
19 WxGMoHE, EvmENcE § 2565 (3d. ed. 1940).
2 TAYE., A PrEmmn y TREAs oN EVmENCE AT Tmn COmmON LAw 277-79
(1898).
3 McCoBwciG, EvmENcE § 323, at 687 (1954).
4 Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 344, 181 Pac. 223, 226 (1919).
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With the proliferation of litigation and crowded court calendars,
more extensive use of judicial notice would seem to be a noteworthy
step toward shortening and simplifying trials. The great writers on
evidence have suggested that courts give greater consideration to the
use of the doctrine as a tool in shortening and improving trial proce-
dure.5 Thayer writes: "[T]he failure to exercise it tends daily to
smother trials with technicality, and monstrously lengthens them out."'
And Wigmore states, "The principle is an instrument of a usefulness
hitherto unimagined by judges."7
The judges, on the other hand, have been prone to emphasize the
need for a cautious approach in the use of judicial notice." One com-
mentator has suggested that judges approach judicial notice cautiously
because fear of reversal has created a nearsighted view of the doctrine.9
The cautious exercise of judicial notice by some California courts
may be due to the shroud of uncertainty surrounding the existing
California statute, particularly its procedural aspects. Section 1875 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure merely makes the declaratory
proposition that "Courts take judicial notice of the following:" and
then lists nine different instances.10 This enactment does not clearly
indicate whether courts are required to take judicial notice of the
matters specified in the statute or whether judicial notice is merely
permissive." Some of the earlier California decisions indicated an
unwillingness on the part of the courts to take judicial notice of Court
records,12 even though such matters appeared to be contemplated by
5 See Keefe, Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STr. L.
REv. 664, 665 (1950).
6 TaAxYr,, op. cit. supra note 2, at 309.
7 9 WIGoMo, EVmENCE § 2568, at 585 ('3d ed. 1940).
8 In Elford v. Hiltabrand, 63 Cal. App. 2d 65, 73, 146 P.2d 510, 515 (1944) the
court said: "Furthermore, the doctrine of judicial notice of matters claimed to be of
common and general knowledge should be cautiously exercised." In State v. Clousing,
205 Minn. 296, 301, 285 N.W. 711, 714 (1939) the court said: "Judicial notice is to be
taken with caution, and every reasonable doubt as to the propriety of its exercise in a
given case should be resolved against it."
9 Keefe, Landis & Shaad, supra note 5, at 665.
1o CAL. CODE Cw. PRoc. § 1875 is repealed by Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, § 61, at
1360, operative January 1, 1967.
'1 Chadbourn, A Study Relating to the judicial Notice Article of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, 6 CAL. LAw REvIIoN Co M.'N, REPORTS, R.ECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES
829, 838 (1964).
12In Popcorn Equip. Co. v. Page, 92 Cal. App. 2d 448, 207 P.2d 647 (1949), the
court refused to take judicial notice of court records of a prior action, saying that,
"although the statute provides that courts will take judicial notice of the acts of ...
judicial departments of the state ... and although the Railroad Commission and the
Industrial Accident Commission act judicially and their judgments are res judicata ...
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the statute.' Other cases have held by way of dicta that judicial notice
is compulsory,14 and still others have stated that it is optional." The
uncertainty surrounding the effect of Code of Civil Procedure section
1875 is made even more manifest by the decisions holding that the
section does not limit the power of the courts to take judicial notice. 6
Hopefully, the judicial notice article in the new California Evidence
Code' 7 will dispel much of the confusion and uncertainty now existing
in the use of judicial notice by trial and appellate courts. Moreover, the
codification of what may be noticed, and the procedural safeguards to
be observed in so doing, should assure litigants and lawyers that their
legitimate expectations in court will be fairly met.
The new Evidence Code completely revamps the existing statute
although it makes only minor revisions in the matters that are subject
to judicial notice. The significant change and the real impact of the
judicial notice division of the Evidence Code is procedural. It states
clearly and concisely the procedural requirements; whereas, with the
single exception of judicial notice of foreign law,'8 the statute to be
repealed is silent on any procedural requirement of notice to the parties
when judicial notice is sought to be invoked.
The statutory scheme for judicial notice in the Code is based upon
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 9 Under the Evidence Code some
nevertheless judicial notice is not taken of decisions of the Railroad Commission or of
findings and award of the Industrial Accident Commission." Id. at 453, 207 P.2d at 650.
In Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal. 2d 632, 638, 198 P.2d 1, 5 (1948), the court
stated, "It is the general rule that 'the court will not take judicial notice of other actions,
not even those pending or concluded in the same court'."
In Stafford v. Ware, 187 Cal. App. 2d 227, 9 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1960), the court
pointed out that the decisions on judicial notice of court records were in hopeless conflict.
Fortunately, the California Supreme Court in Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal. 2d 492, 15
Cal. Rptr. 87, 364 P.2d 263 (1961), ended the confusion with a flat declaration that
judicial notice of a prior judgment in a different case is taken under CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc.
§ 1875(3), provided that the court is properly advised and the adversary is given the
opportunity to be heard. Popcorn was disapproved, and Wolfsen was overruled.
13 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1875(3).
14 People v. Cowles, 142 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 865, 866-67, 298 P.2d 732, 733 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Alameda, 1956); People v. Stewart, 107 Cal. App. Supp. 757, 764, 288
Pac. 57, 60-61 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1930).
15 E.g., Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 Pac. 223 (1919).
16 Standley v. Knapp, 113 Cal. App. 91, 298 Pac. 109 (1931). In Berry v. Chaplin,
74 Cal. App. 2d 669, 675, 169 P.2d 453, 458 (1946) the court said, "The scope of judi-
cial notice has been amplified by the courts far beyond the matters enumerated in
Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure... .
1 7 
CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §§ 450-60.
18 CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 1875(4).
19 The UNwOPt Rur.Ls OF EvDENcE were approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners in 1953. Rules 9-12 of Article 2 of the UNn'oPm Rur.Es OF EvmENcE
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matters of law and fact must be noticed whether requested or not,2"
while certain other matters of law and fact may be noticed by the
judge.2' The latter must be noticed upon request if the adverse party
is notified and the court is furnished with adequate information to
determine the matter.2 The new Evidence Code also guarantees the
parties reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the pro-
priety of taking judicial notice, or the tenor thereof,28 whenever a
matter of substantial consequence is involved. 4
In this article a seriatim listing and discussion of the sections of the
Evidence Code will not be attempted since the comments of the Law
Revision Commission or the Assembly or Senate Committee on the
Judiciary found after each section amplify and explain the statutory
language. Instead, an effort will be made to discuss some of the under-
lying policy considerations in the judicial notice sections. The discus-
sion can logically be divided between judicial notice of facts and judi-
cial notice of law, and the procedural aspects that are attendant to
each.
Judicial Notice of Facts
The application of the doctrine of judicial notice of facts is most
frequently found in the area designated as common knowledge.2 5 Some-
times these facts are termed those that are universally recognized or
are matters of public notoriety and general knowledge.2
In the Evidence Code "facts and propositions of generalized knowl-
edge that are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the
subject of dispute" must be judicially noticed even in the absence of a
request.27 Under section 452 of the Evidence Code, facts that are of
common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and
relate to judicial notice. The California Law Revision Commission was authorized to
make a study to determine whether the law of evidence in California should be revised
to conform to the UNioRm Rr..s oF EVIDENCE. See Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 42, at 263-65.
The California Law Revision Commission recommended the adoption of a new code of
evidence rather than the adoption of the UNwoRm RuLEs oF EVIDENCE. See 7 CAW-
FORNiA LAW REVIsIoN Cozvr'N, REPORTS RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 34 (1965).
20 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 451.
21 CAL. EVIDENCE CoDE § 452.
2 2 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 453.
2 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 454.
2 4 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 455.
2 5 McCompacK, EVIDENCE § 324, at 689 (1954).
2 6 In 1 JoNEs, THE LAw or EVIDENCE IN Crvia CASES, § 105, at 188 (4th ed. 1938)
it is stated that "the fundamental guide in determining the facts which may be judicially
known is notoriety or the common and general knowledge of all men."
27 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 451(f).
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cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute,28 and those facts that are
not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and
accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable
accuracy,29 may be judicially noticed; and if a request is made, such
facts must be judicially noticed.30 These very generalized rules repre-
sent an eclectic approach to describing those matters of fact that are
subject to judicial notice.31 It can be readily observed that any distinc-
tions between universally known facts and facts of common knowledge
are indeed subtle.2
Conclusive Effect of Judicial Notice
It is important to note that under section 451(f) where judicial
notice is mandatory, as well as under section 452(g) and (h), where
judicial notice is permissive, the Evidence Code in each of the three
situations requires the fact to be judicially noticed to be indisputable.
The concept that only indisputable facts are judicially noticed under
the Evidence Code has a very significant corollary, also found in the
Evidence Code, that a fact judicially noticed is conclusive and no evi-
dence to the contrary is admissible."
By thus limiting judicial notice of facts to indisputable matters and
proscribing contrary evidence, the framers of the Evidence Code have
adopted the approach of Professor Morgan and rejected the position
of Thayer and Wigmore. Professor Morgan and Dean Wigmore stand
at opposite poles in the argument over judicial notice of facts.-
28 CAL. Ev ENcF CODE § 452(g).
29 CAL. EvmEcE CODE § 452(h).
8o CAL. EvmENcE: CODE § 453.
8 1 Jowsm, op. cit. supra note 26, at 188 states that, "because of the nature of the
subject, such rules must necessarily be vague and general... :'
82The degree of notoriety of certain streets affords an example of the distinctions:
(a) That Wall Street is located in New York City would seem to be so universally known
that it could not reasonably be the subject of dispute. (b) The fact that Market Street is
a main thoroughfare in San Francisco is a matter of such common knowledge within the
territorial jurisdiction of any court in California that it cannot reasonably be the subject
of dispute. (Note here that territorial jurisdiction means the location of the court and
common knowledge must exist within that court's territorial jurisdiction, even if the fact
to be noticed lies outside the court's jurisdiction.) (c) That Silverado Trail is an im-
portant highway in Napa County is not a universally known fact nor is it a matter of
common knowledge in California. However, it is a fact that is not reasonably subject to
dispute and is capable of immediate and accurate determination by reference to a source
of indisputable accuracy, such as a map of Napa County published by a governmental
agency.
38 CAL. EvMqCE CODE § 457, comment.
34 McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Con-
troversy, 14 VND. L. Rrv. 779 (1961).
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The Morgan view holds that judicial notice of facts is limited to
those matters where the ,probability of truth of the proposition is so
great that it is notoriously indisputable among reasonable men. 5 And
if judicial notice of a matter means that it is indisputable, it must
logically follow that no evidence to rebut the judicially noticed fact
would be admissible.8 If the judge takes judicial notice of a fact, the
controversy over that fact is concluded; no further proof will be taken
as to it, and the judge will direct the jury accordingly. This result seems
consistent with the objectives of the doctrine of judicial notice, viz.,
(1) to avoid the waste of time, money, and effort involved in proving
matters that are patently true, and (2) to promote rational fact finding
by preventing fact finders from erroneously finding as untrue, facts
which are known to be true.
83
The Wigmore view holds that a fact judicially noticed is not con-
clusively established, and the opponent is not prevented from disputing
the matter by contrary evidence if he believes it to be disputable.88
Thayer stated that taking judicial nofice "does not import that the
matter is indisputable. It is not necessarily anything more than a prima
facie recognition, leaving the matter still open to controversy." 9 This
view would seem to put judicial notice in the category of presumptions,
although the proponents of this view have failed to indicate what type
of presumption is created. It also has been suggested that to equate
judicial notice with presumptions is impracticable because of the diffi-
culty in determining what sort of burden would be required on the part
of the adversary to offset the effect of the presumption.
4 0
Professor Davis, a noted commentator on administrative law, has
added his voice in support of the Wigmore-Thayer conception that
85 Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Huiv. L. REV. 269, 274 (1944).
86 "In any system designed to adjust relations between members of a society . . .
a decision contrary to what is accepted as indisputable fact in that society cannot be
justified. . . . [T]he court cannot . . . adjust legal relations among members of society
and thus fulfill the sole purpose of its creation if it permits the parties to take issue on,
and thus secure results contrary to, what is so notoriouly true as not to be the subject
of reasonable dispute, or what is capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by
resort to resources of indisputable accuracy easily accessible to men in the situation of
members of the court. This, it is submitted, is the rock of reason and policy upon which
judicial notice of facts is built." Id. at 273-74.
87 REooT OF TBE Naw JissEY ST.JPmEM COVET Comsnranm oN EVMENCE 28
(1963).
88 9 WGMORE, EVDENCE § 2567 (3d ed. 1940).
89 THAYE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 308.
4o McNaughton, supra note 34, at 784. Morgan has said that if the courts enmesh
the problems of judicial notice in the language of presumptions it will open another legal
Pandora's box. Morgan, supra note 35, at 286.
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judicial notice should not be limited to indisputable facts.4 Two great
American judges have also purportedly supported the Wigmore-Thayer
view that facts judicially noticed are subject to rebuttal.'
41 Davis, judicial Notice, 55 COLJum. L. R v. 945, 951-52 (1955). Professor Davis,
whose orientation is toward administrative law and non jury adjudications, has expressed
concern that limiting judicial notice to indisputable facts will hamper the use of legis-
lative facts. The term "legislative facts" was introduced into the legal lexicon by Pro-
lessor Davis in Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HAv. L. REv. 364, 402-10 (1942). The term refers to legislative histories,
books, treatises, economic and social data and the like that courts use in formulating a
proper rule of law that has policy considerations beyond the particular parties to the
controversy. Legislative facts are contrasted with adjudicative facts which are of sig-
nificance only to the parties to the immediate action.
Legislative facts are discussed in the text infra under that heading. However, it
would be well to state at this point that the economic data, books, and periodicals that a
court might consider in arriving at a determination of what the law should be, would
necessarily include controversial and disputable matters.
Hence a caveat to the general proposition that courts will judicially notice only
indisputable matters. It should be noted that the California Law Revision Commission
has tacitly recognized this problem: "That a court may consider legislative history,
discussion by learned writers in treatises and law reviews, materials that contain con-
troversial economic and social facts or findings or that indicate contemporary opinion,
and similar materials is inherent in the requirement that it take judicial notice of the
law." CAL. EvmWcE CoDE § 450, comment.
42 Cardozo, J. in Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300
(1937) and L. Hand, J. in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945). A close analysis of these two cases would indicate that results were
desirable but some of the dicta on judicial notice may have been unnecessary.
In Ohio Bell the Ohio Commission made a rate determination based upon data never
received in evidence and refused to allow the company to analyze or rebut it. Mr. Justice
Cardozo pointed out that the decisions did not warrant treating such material as within
the field of judicial notice, which seems entirely appropriate, but then went on to say
in a dictum, "Moreover, notice, even when taken, has no other effect than to relieve
one of the parties to the controversy of the burden of resorting to the usual forms of
evidence." 301 U.S. at 301. In a comment on this decision, Professor Morgan has stated,
"all that was decided, was that a party could not ask that a finding be sustained by
reliance upon judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted in documents brought
to the attention of the tribunal after the close of trial or hearing without giving the party
against whom the material was used an opportunity to know its content or to meet it
by showing that it was not a proper subject of judicial notice." Morgan, The Law of
Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HA v. L. Bxv. 481, 486 (1946).
In Aluminum Co. the court took judicial notice of the contents of the Truman Report
to a United States Senate Committee relating to the amount of bauxite in Arkansas, but
announced that the facts noticed would not be considered conclusive. The court stated
that, "facts which a court may judicially 'notice' do not for that reason become indis-
putable. Wigmore, § 2567a." 148 F.2d at 446. The court refused to accept as conclusive
the assertions in the report of the committee. Ibid. Professor Morgan agrees with the
result of this decision, but is critical of the court's determination to take judicial notice
of such controversial facts. Morgan, supra at 485-86. Since the contents of the report
would not meet the test of common knowledge, nor would the contents of the report
be of indisputable accuracy, the Morgan view would not permit judicial notice of such
facts. However, Morgan suggests the court might well have taken judicial notice of the
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It is interesting to note the viewpoint of Professor McNaughton,
who has published excerpts of a preliminary draft of a proposed revi-
sion of the judicial notice chapter of Wigmore on Evidence.43 In this
draft he clearly espouses the Morgan approach and rejects his prede-
cessor's thesis that judicially noticed facts are not conclusively estab-
lished. Many other leading authorities have also endorsed the Morgan
view;44 this concept is consistent with existing California law45 and is
reiterated in the Uniform Rules.46 Although there is respectable au-
thority to the contrary, the framers of the Evidence Code have chosen
the approach championed by Morgan. Because of this important policy
decision, judicial notice of facts under the Evidence Code will be
limited to those facts that are indisputable, and no evidence to rebut
the judicially noticed fact will be permitted.
Notice to the Parties
Under existing California statutory law, there is no requirement
that the judge advise the parties of his intention to take judicial notice,
except when taking judicial notice of foreign law. 7 In keeping with
traditional notions of fairness, a judge ought to be required to advise
the parties of his intention to take judicial notice if the fact noticed has
existence of the report as an official document and thus allow it to be received in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule. The report could then be admitted as evidence of
the facts contained therein, but this evidence would of course be subject to disproof
by the adversary's stronger evidence. Under this rationale the accuracy of the contents
would not be judicially noticed.
4 8 McNaughton, supra note 34.
44 McConmc, EvmE- cE § 330, at 711 (1954) states that, "accordingly the weight
of reason and the prevailing authority support the view that a ruling that a fact will be
judicially noticed precludes contradictory evidence and requires that the judge instruct
the jury that they must accept the fact as true." Keefe, Landis & Shaad, supra note 5,
at 668. "The better view would seem to be that a fact, once judicially noticed, is not
open to evidence disputing it. The very premise of the doctrine is that matter judicially
noticed should be indisputably true." Ibid. MoDELn CODE OF EvwN cNE rule 804 (1942)
accords with the Morgan view. The comment to the Model Code rule states: "If a matter
falls within the domain of judicial knowledge, it is beyond the realm of dispute; there-
fore, evidence is unnecessary. It is the judge's function to decide whether a matter is
a subject of evidence or of judicial notice. . . . In a few cases it is said that the judge
should have received evidence offered to show the opposite of what he declared to be
a judicially noticed fact. What is meant is that the subject did not fall within the realm
of judicial notice."
4 5 CAL. CODE Cxv. Pnoc. § 2102 (repealed by Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, § 132, at
1336, operative January 1, 1967) provides: "whenever the knowledge of the court is,
by this code, made evidence of a fact, the court is bound to declare such knowledge to
the jury, who are bound to accept it."
46 UNwOB m RurLE or EVIDENCE 11.
4
7 CAL. CODE Cry. PROC. § 1875(4).
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an important bearing on the outcome of the litigation. Indeed such a
requirement is consistent with procedural due process. 48 Such notice
would enable the parties to present information which might bear
upon the propriety of noticing the fact, or upon the tenor of the matter
to be noticed. 9 Moreover, a hearing on the propriety of taking judi-
cial notice may eliminate obvious error.50
Quite obviously, notice to the parties and a hearing should not be
required on each occasion that the judge intends to take judicial notice.
It is apparent that some matters are so commonplace that the thought
processes of the judge will automatically assume many facts that have
not been proved. Thayer has written: "In conducting a process of judi-
cial reasoning, as of other reasoning, not a step can be taken without
assuming something which has not been proved.. .- Thus, the judge
can assume an Oldsmobile is an automobile without notifying the
parties of his intention to take judicial notice of this fact and conduct-
ing a hearing on the accuracy of this assumption. Common sense dic-
tates that the judge should have a reasonable amount of discretion in
determining whether fairness requires notification to the parties of his
intention to take judicial notice. 2
Common sense and fairness are manifest in the judicial notice
article of the Evidence Code since it contains substantial procedural
safeguards that are both sensible and functional. Under section 455 of
the Evidence Code a court is required to notify the parties of its inten-
tion whenever judicial notice is proposed to be taken of any matter
specified in section 452 or in subdivision (f) of section 451 that is of
substantial consequence to the determination of the action. Section 458
makes this same requirement also incumbent upon a reviewing court if
48 "[I]f cases now can be decided according to whatever law the judge sees fit to
apply and is able to discover by his own private researches, undisclosed to the parties,
then much that hitherto has been regarded as essential to the right to pronounce judg-
ment-the raising of an issue ...and an opportunity to know what the deciding tri-
bunal is considering and to be heard with respect to both law and fact-would seem
to have been abolished. I am unwilling to assume that a power so contrary to the plainest
principles of fair dealing and due process of law was intended or has been conferred."
Arams v. Arams, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253, 182 Misc. 328, 336 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
49 McCoRzacr, EvmNwcE § 330, at 708 (1954).
50 WyzAN A TmAi. Juno's Fnnnnom AND RESPONSmmY 18-19 (1952). "[T]he
judge, before deriving any conclusions from any such extra-judicial document or infor-
mation, should lay it before the parties for their criticism. . . . [Blefore a judge acts
upon a consideration of any kind, he ought to give the parties a chance to meet it. This
opportunity is owed as a matter of fairness and also to prevent egregious error." ibid.
51 TH&YEP,, A PREL,mmAY TREATISE ON EViDENCE AT TE ComMoN LAw 279
(1898).
5 2 McCopzi c, EvmENcE § 330, at 708 (1954).
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the matter was not judicia.lly noticed in the trial court. If it is a matter
of substantial consequence, the court must afford a hearing whether the
court on its own proposes to take judicial notice or a party requests
that the court do so. By confining the mandatory requirement for a
hearing to matters of substantial consequence, the framers of the Evi-
dence Code have vested the court with sensible discretion and have
eliminated any question about the necessity for a hearing on the
propriety of taking judicial notice in matters of trivial significance."
Under section 453 of the Evidence Code, the party requesting judi-
cial notice of a fact must carry the burden of establishing to the court's
satisfaction that the matter to be judicially noticed is indisputable.
This is done by (a) giving the adverse party notice of his request,5 4 and
(b) by furnishing the court with sufficient information to enable it to
take judicial notice. 5 After notice is given by the party seeking judicial
notice or by the court on its own motion, the court, pursuant to section
455, will hear argument and consider information relevant to (1) the
propriety of taking judicial notice, and (2) the tenor of the matter to
be noticed. The court is given considerable latitude on the type of
information that may be considered. Evidence Code section 454(a) (1)
provides that any pertinent source of information, including the advice
of learned persons, may be used. Subject to the rule of privileges,50
neither party is restricted by the rules of evidence in offering reliable
sources of information or in inducing the judge to consult them. How-
ever, there are certain restrictions. For example, if the court resorts to
information not received in open court, section 455(b) requires that
such information and its source be made a part of the record when it
5 3 in MoDEL CODrE OF EVwENCE rule 804 (1942) and UNwoim ROLE OF EVIDENCE
10(1) there are no apparent exceptions to the requirement that the parties shall be
notified of the intent of the court to take judicial notice. This has been properly criti-
cized by Professor Davis as being inconvenient and time consuming. 2 DAVIs, ADmIN-
IsTRArrE LAW TREATiSE § 15.08, at 388-94 (1958). Davis points out, "When the judge
. . . looks at the testimony of the first witness, he uses extra-record information about
the meaning of words in the English language. . . . His knowledge of the meaning
of the word 'the' comes from beyond the record. He assumes that a man is not thirty
feet tall, that the trains run on rails, that automobiles are not flying machines, that
France is nota part of the United States, and that coal is not a food . . . . Every
simple case involves the assumption of thousands of facts that have not been proved.
. . . In this light, the idea that the judge . . . must give notice to the parties before
he can base his decision on any extra-record facts is an absurdity." Id. at 390.
5 4 CAL. EvIDENCE CODE § 453(a).
55 CAL. EviDENcE CODE § 453(b). The comment to section 453 notes that this notice
may be given through the pleadings, at pretrial, or even during the trial. The reasonable-
ness and the timeliness of the notice will depend upon the circumstances of the particular
case.
56 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 454(a) (2).
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relates to taking judicial notice of a matter of substantial consequence.
Likewise section 454(b) places a limitation upon the court's considera-
tion of the advice of a person learned in foreign law; such advice must
be received in open court or be in writing.
At this preliminary hearing, the court will determine if the fact to
be noticed is disputable. Under the Morgan approach any doubts as
to the propriety of taking judicial notice should at this point be resolved
in the negative.r If the court determines that the fact is not indisput-
ably true, the proponent will be cast back to the general rules of evi-
dence and ordinary methods of proof. If the court denies a request for
judicial notice, such denial must be noted for the record.5 If the court,
after hearing the information presented by both parties, determines
that the matter is within the field of judicial notice and determines that
the information is reliable, the fact will be judicially noticed and
removed from the field of dispute. Pursuant to the Morgan theory
embraced in section 457, the matter judicially noticed will be deemed
conclusive, and no evidence to the contrary will be allowed.
Judicial Notice of Law
Questions of fact are for the jury and questions of law are for the
judge is a maxim spawned by the common law that has been criticized
as inaccurate and over-simplified. 9 This rubric has also been incor-
porated into California law. 0
Under this system of dual responsibility, the judge is charged with
the responsibility of knowledge of the law or the capacity to acquire it.
By his professional training and experience the judge is presumably
qualified to know and interpret the law; but how much law should the
judge be expected to know? If the judge does not know the law, what
sources can he be expected to consult to ascertain the law? The
answers to these questions form the basic policy considerations in the
judicial notice of law sections in the Evidence Code.
57 Keefe, Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 664, 668 (1950), "Ifln relation to a specific problem of notice, a balancing of the
interests between judicial administration and the rights of the litigants requires that the
doctrine be applied strictly." ibid. See also Knowlton, Judicial Notice, 10 RuTcExs L.
REv. 501 (1956).
58 CAL. EVIDENcE CODE § 456.
59 See THAYEan, op. cit. supra note 51, 183-262.
6o CAL. CODE Crv. Pnoc. § 2101 (repealed by Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, § 132, at
1366, operative January 1, 1967) provides: "all questions of fact where the trial is by
jury . .. are to be decided by the jury .... CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 2102 (repealed
by Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, § 132, at 1366, operative January 1, 1967) provides: "all
questions of law . . . are to be decided by the Court . . . "
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If the law is not familiar lore to the judge, he can make his own in-
vestigations or rely on counsel to present cases, statutes,6' texts, and
briefs. The normal method of finding the applicable law is by informal
investigation of any sources satisfactory to the judge, i.e. by judicial
notice.62
As a generalization, it can be said that where the source material of
law is readily accessible, the judge, as part of his role in a judicial pro-
ceeding, should know the law; and it is reasonable, therefore, to require
him to ascertain the applicable law. On the other hand, where the
source material of applicable law is not easily available, as in the case of
foreign law, the judge should not be required to know the law. How-
ever, he may judicially notice it if proper source materials are brought
to his attention.
In the Evidence Code these general policies are followed so that
judicial notice of law is divided into two categories: (a) Those matters
of law that the court must judicially notice 68 and (b) those matters of
law that the court may judicially notice"' and upon request, notification
of the parties, and being fumished sufficient information, must judi-
cially notice.65
Mandatory Judicial Notice
Included in section 451 are those matters of law that the judge is
presumed to know or can reasonably be expected to discover even if the
parties fail to provide him with the appropriate statute, case, or rule.
This obviously includes the law of the forum, i.e. the decisional, con-
stitutional, and public statutory law of California and of the United
States,66 as well as the administrative orders and regulations of Cali-
fornia state agencies and those promulgated by federal agencies that
are printed in the Federal Register.67 Finally, subsections (c) and (d)
of section 451 require the judge to take judicial notice of the rules of
professional conduct of the State Bar and rules of practice and proce-
dure adopted by the Judicial Council and the various federal courts.
6 1 Baron Parke's admonition to counsel is apposite, "[F]or the future it would save
time if, when you founded an objection upon an Act of Parliament, you had the Act
here; for though we are supposed to keep the statutes in our heads, we do not." Cuwsu,
TkE TkuAL OF JoN FROST roR HIGH TREtsoN UNDER A SPECIAL CoMnssIoN AT MON-
monTH 168 (1840).
62 McCowMc; EViDENCE § 326, at 694 (1954).
6 8 CAL. EviDENCE CODE § 451(a)-(d).
64 CAL. EvIDMECE CODE § 452(a)-(f).
65 CAL. EvmENCE CODE § 453.
66 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 451(a).





The most significant hiatus in the mandatory provision of section
451 is the omission of the law of sister states. Section 452 permits sister
state law to be judicially noticed, and section 453 requires it to be
noticed only if the adverse party is notified and sufficient information
is furnished to the court. This classification of sister state law into the
permissive area of judicial notice, rather than the mandatory section,
may represent a change in existing law. 8
It is interesting to note that an earlier draft of the Evidence Code
placed sister state law in the mandatory section. 9 The retreat from this
view is possibly due to a policy decision that recognizes certain small
county law libraries may provide inadequate sources of sister state law.
In addition to permitting judicial notice of sister state law, section
452 delineates and clarifies three other significant areas of law that may
be judicially noticed. Under that section, judicial notice may be taken
of ordinances,70 court records,71 and foreign law.72 Judicial notice of
these three areas of law has been troublesome for the courts and has
resulted in much confusion in the decisions.7"
Ordinances
Under existing California decisional law strange distinctions have
been made with regard to judicial notice of ordinances. Thus, it has
been held that a municipal court will take judicial notice of ordinances
in effect within its jurisdiction,74 and yet superior courts will not take
6Bin re Bartges, 44 Cal. 2d 241, 282 P.2d 47 (1955), held that judicial notice of
the statutory law of a sister state is required at least when the law has been called to
the court's attention.
In Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 164 Cal. App. 2d 400, 330 P.2d 933 (1958), the
court applied the law of Illinois and in so doing rejected appellant's contention that in
the absence of proof to the contrary, the law of Illinois is presumed to be the same as
the law of this state. The court held that our courts take judicial notice of the laws of
sister states.
69 7 CnFworaNN LAw REVIsION CoNMa?, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIs
73 (1965). UNIoRm Ru=u Or Evsm, cE 9(1) also provides for mandatory judicial
notice of sister state law. Refusal to judicially notice sister state law may possibly be
unconstitutional as a violation of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.
It has been suggested by Lawrence Hartwig that a federal statute to require judicial
notice by state courts of the law of other states be enacted. Hartwig, Congressional
Enactment of Uniform Judicial Notice Act, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 174 (1941).
70 CaL. EvmE.cr CODE § 452(b).
71 CAL. EvmENc; CODE § 452(d).
72 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 452(f).
7 3 See, e.g., Stafford v. Ware, 187 Cal. App. 2d 227, 9 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1960).
74 People v. Cowles, 142 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 865, 867, 298 P.2d 732, 733-34 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Alameda, 1956).
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judicial notice of municipal or county ordinances.75 The refusal on the
part of the courts to judicially notice an ordinance produces yet another
anomaly; if a party wishes to present an ordinance to the court he must
prove it like any other fact. Once it is submitted into evidence, what is
the role of the ordinance under our trial procedure where questions of
fact are for the jury and questions of law for the judge? Should ordi-
nances received in evidence be taken into the jury room with the other
exhibits? Fortunately, one California court refused to make a bad
situation worse by indicating that the admission of ordinances into
evidence was for the sole purpose of informing the judge what the law
was. By this adroit procedure, the trial judge refused a request that the
ordinances be exhibits for jury consideration.76 The clear cut procedure
for judicial notice of ordinances under section 452 and section 453 of
the Evidence Code should eliminate the present illogical and unsuit-
able evidentiary treatment of ordinances.
Court Records
It would seem all too obvious that a court would notice all of the
records of the institution over which it presides; yet the courts have
been slow to accept the concept that they should judicially notice their
own court records. 7 California courts were prone to follow this slow
and unrealistic approach until the California Supreme Court in 1961
breathed new life into the doctrine of judicial notice by disapproving
and overruling a long line of cases .7 The Evidence Code restates the
existing law announced in Flores by permitting judicial notice to be




Judicial notice of foreign law has had a long and tortuous history. 0
Difficulties in the application of foreign law arose because the early
common law judges of insular England had little contact with law of
the continent and thus did not develop significant knowledge of foreign
7 5 Neuber v. Royal Realty Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d 596, 622, 195 P.2d 501, 518 (1948).
76 Ibid. The court acknowledged that courts take judicial knowledge of statutes,
but not of ordinances, and went on to say "it would seem to us just as improper to
submit ordinances to the jury for interpretation as it would be to hand them a copy
of the Civil Code . . . . Just as in the cases of statutes, the proper construction of an
ordinance is a question not for the jury but for the court." Ibid.
77 McCoVMcsU, EVmENCE § 327, at 701 (1954).
78 Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal. 2d 492, 15 Cal. Rptr. 87, 364 P.2d 263 (1961).
79 CAL. EvmNCE CODE §§ 452(d), 453.
80 See 9 Wic .oR, EvmcE §§ 2558, 2573 (3d ed. 1940).
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law. Since the judges had no particular understanding of foreign law,
it was not the subject of judicial notice; hence the custom arose that
foreign law should be pleaded and proved to the jury as any other fact.
This practice had the unfortunate result that the jury determined the
foreign law; in early days its guess was probably as good as the
judge's.8 ' This common law tradition of treating foreign law as a fact
has been embraced by many American jurisdictions, and it is also the
basis for some states classifying the law of a sister state as foreign law. 2
-This method of treating foreign law as a fact to be pleaded and
proved with the ultimate determination left to the jury has been criti-
cized as unsound. Wigmore has stated that, "the only sound view,
either on principle or on policy, is that it should be proved to the judge,
who is decidedly the more appropriate person to determine it."8  Some
courts have observed that while foreign law is a fact to be pleaded and
proved, the proof should be directed to the court rather than to the
jury. 4 Under this view, the court determines as a fact what the foreign
law is and then instructs the jury on the foreign law in the same manner
as it would instruct on any other matter of law.
The only reasonable basis for asserting that foreign law is a fact to
be pleaded and proved is to put the court and counsel on notice and
to provide an opportunity to investigate the foreign law. If such notice
and opportunity to investigate can be provided, judicial notice would
be a more suitable vehicle for the application of foreign law to a law-
suit than would be the proof of it as a fact.
Until 1957, California had no statutory provision for taking judicial
notice of foreign law,88 and the decisions reflected the common law
notions. Some of the decisions indicated that California courts were
neither authorized nor required to take judicial notice of foreign
statutes;88 others presumed that the foreign law was the same as that
of California in the absence of pleading and proof to the contrary.8r In
81 Keefe, Landis & Shaad, supra note 57, at 674.
82 Ibid.
839 WIcMoNR, EVMENCE § 2558, at 525-26 (3d ed. 1940).
84 Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones L. (N.C.) 130 (1857), Cited in 9 WIGmonE, EvmENc
§ 2558, at 527 (3d ed. 1940); Salshen v. Houle 85 N.H. 126, 155 AUt. 47 (1931).85 The lack of any such provision had been noted, with the following recommenda-
tion: "What California should do, is to enact one reasonably clear statute to deal with
the entire problem of judicial notice of foreign law." Keefe, Landis & Shaad, supra note
57, at 677 n.48.
86Wickersham v. Johnston, 104 Cal. 407, 38 Pac. 89 (1894); 164 East 72d St.
Corp. v. Ismay, 65 Cal. App. 2d 574, 151 P.2d 29 (1944).
87 Loaiza v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. 11, 24 Pac. 707 (1890); Silveyra v. Harper,
82 Cal. App. 2d 761, 187 P.2d 83 (1948).
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1957, the California judicial notice statute was amended to provide
for judicial notice of the law of foreign countries.88 This statute re-
quires notice to the parties, allows the court to consider expert opinion,
and permits it to either dismiss the action without prejudice or apply
the law of California if the court is unable to determine the foreign
law.
The Evidence Code gives judicial notice of foreign law the same
treatment as the existing California statute enacted in 1957. The court
is not required to apply foreign law since it may be unable to ascertain
what the law is; however, if counsel, after proper notice, can persuade
the court what the foreign law is by furnishing sufficient information,
the court will be required to take judicial notice of the foreign law.89
In determining the tenor of foreign law, the court is not restricted by
the formal rules of evidence, but may resort to any pertinent source of
information including the advice of experts. 0 If the court does resort
to the advice of any expert, such advice must be in writing or be
received in open court. The Evidence Code also permits the court to
appoint a disinterested expert in order to enable the court to take judi-
cial notice of foreign law.91 It may be noted here that the Code allows
the court to appoint an expert to give advice on any matter proposed
to be judicially noticed.
The existing statute and the new Code add a desirable provision on
foreign law that is not found in the Uniform Rules of Evidence. No
provision is made in the Uniform Rules of Evidence to indicate what a
court should do if it is unable to determine what the foreign law is,
other than decline to take judicial notice.92 Section 311 of the Evidence
Code provides that if the court determines that foreign law is ap-
88 CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 1875(4) (repealed by Cal. Stat. 1965 ch. 299, § 61,
at 1360, operative January 1, 1967). Subdivision 4 was added in 1957 to provide that
courts take judicial notice of: "The law and statutes of foreign countries and of political
subdivisions of foreign countries; provided, however, that to enable a party to ask that
judicial notice thereof be taken, reasonable notice shall be given to the other parties
to the action in the pleadings or otherwise .... " The statute also provides: "In cases
arising under subdivision 4 of this section, the court' may also resort to the advice of
persons learned in the subject matter, which advice, if not received in open court, shall
be in writing and made a part of the record in the action or proceeding. If a court is
unable to determine what the law of a foreign country or a political subdivision of a
foreign country is, the court may, as the ends of justice require, either apply the law
of this State if it can do so consistently with the Constitutions of this State and of the
United States or dismiss the action without prejudice." CAL. CODE: Crv. Paoc. § 1875.
89 CAL. EVMENCE CODE §§ 452-53.
9o CAr. EvmENcE CODE § 454.
9 1 CAL. EvIDENCE CODE: § 460.
92 Uwwonm RuLE oF EVIDENCE 10(3).
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plicable but is unable to determine its tenor, the court may (a) apply
the law of California, or (b) dismiss the action without prejudice.
Under the sensible approach of the Evidence Code, the anachro-
nisms of the common law relating to proof of ordinances, court records,
and foreign law are swept away. Instead of proving these matters of
law in the same manner as proving ordinary facts, and thus being sub-
ject to the ordinary rules of evidence, the Code establishes reasonable
rules that equate with due process and enable the court to proceed
directly to the applicable rules of law via judicial notice.
Legislative Facts
In the majority of contested cases a court is called upon to resolve
the factual dispute between the immediate parties. When the court is
required to resolve issues that relate to the specific parties to the litiga-
tion-who did what, where, when, how and with what intent, the
court is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts so deter-
mined are called adjudicative facts. 3 On the other hand, when a court
is required to formulate a rule of law that may have policy conse-
quences far beyond the particular case, the court in a sense is acting
legislatively; in determining what rule of law to adopt the court may
have to resort to factual material found in books, treatises, legislative
histories, and the like. These facts have been denominated legislative
facts. 4 Since the use of legislative facts is for the purpose of enabling
the court to formulate a proper rule of law, the treatment of so-called
legislative facts is discussed under matters of law rather than under
matters of fact.
The use of legislative facts has great significance when a court is
called upon to create new law,95 or to determine the constitutionality of
a statute.90
How are these facts to be presented? "The usual resort... for ascer-
tainment of legislative facts is not through formal proof by sworn
witnesses and authenticated documents but by the process of judicial
notice."97 That this has been a long standing custom is evident from
93 Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 945, 952 (1955).
94 See note 41 supra. Many legal writers recognize this term coined by Professor
Davis, but the decisions have not articulated it in terms of legislative facts until recently.
See generally 2 DAvis, A-mISRTaAr LAw TREnEisE § 15.03 (Supp. 1965, at 64);
McCommcE, EvmrwcE 705 (1954); Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of
the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 Wis. L.
lEv. 39, 50.
95 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JlDICrLA PROCESS 113-14 (1921).
0692 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 94, § 15.03 (Supp. 1965, at 68).
97 McCoRNUC, EVmENCE § 329, at 705 (1954).
the writings of some judges; Lord Mansfield had no reluctance to con-
sider facts dehors the record in determining what the law should be:
"I thought a good deal of the point, and endeavoured to get what as-
sistance I could by conversing with some gentlemen of experience in
adjustments."98 Mr. Justice Holmes stated, "As the judge is bound to
declare the law, he must know or discover the facts that establish the
law."99
That California courts have judicially noticed legislative facts is
manifest in the decisions. In one case the court held:
In the usual and ordinary case.., it is the duty of the trial court in
nonjury cases.., to weigh the testimony upon the material issuable
facts and make its findings thereon. But when the question at issue is
that of the constitutionality of a statute, the duty which devolves upon
the trial court is vastly different. In the latter case, the province of the
court is not to weigh the evidence before it, but to ascertain whether
there are any facts in the record or outside of it, of which it may take
judicial notice, which would sustain the Legislature in enacting the
statute. 00
Disputable Data
Should the policy notion of indisputability associated with judicial
notice of adjudicative facts apply when a court examines legislative
facts? McCormick, who adopts the Morgan view that facts must be
certain and indisputable before they can be judicially noticed, states
that there are different considerations in the use of legislative facts, and
he indicates there should be no requirement of indisputability. "Such a
requirement seems inappropriate here where the facts are often gen-
eralized and statistical and where their use is more nearly argumenta-
tive, or as a help to value-judgments, than conclusive or demonstra-
live."1' 1 Even Morgan recognizes that there is a distinction between
judicial notice of law and judicial notice of fact. Morgan indicates that
98 Lewis v. Rucker, 2 Burr. 1167, 1172, 97 Eng. Rep. 769, 772 (K.B. 1761).
99 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 227 (1908).
100 Lord v. Henderson, 105 Cal. App. 2d 426, 433, 234 P.2d 197, 201 (1951).
Also, in Doyle v. Board of Barber Examiners, 219 Cal. App. 2d 504, 33 Cal. Rptr. 349
(1963), the court judicially noticed statistical records of Board of Barber Examiners.
Other examples of consideration of extra-record legislative facts used in formulating
rules of law include Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), where
the Court went outside the record for psychiatric facts about criminal insanity and on
the basis of these facts rejected the M'Naghten rule, and Brown v. Board of Educ. 347
U.S. 483 (1954), where the Court cited the writings of psychologists and sociologists
in support of a lower court finding that legally enforced segregation in schools caused
an inferiority in Negro children.
101 McConwfci, EvmFcE § 329, at 705 (1954).
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the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusions of law; he
may reach a conclusion that appears to be against the overwhelming
weight of available data.0 2 Thus, he inferentially acknowledges that
a judge may consider disputable data in deteimining what law to apply.
Professor Davis has been a staunch advocate of the unrestricted use
of legislative facts in formulating laws and considering constitutional
questions. Throughout his writings on judicial notice he preaches the
doctrine that legislative facts need not be indisputable.03
The Uniform Rules of Evidence do not offer any enlightenment on
the issue of judicially noticing disputable legislative facts since the
Uniform Rules fail to distinguish between legislative facts and adjudi-
cative facts.
The New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence recog-
nized the omission from the Uniform Rules of Evidence of any refer-
ence to judicial notice of legislative facts and determined to meet it
head on.'04 The New Jersey Committee recommended a section be
added to the rules to be adopted by New Jersey that would permit
judicial notice to be taken of any matter, including disputable matters,
that would be an aid in deciding what the law should be. 0 5
The Evidence Code does not directly recognize the use of legislative
facts to formulate rules of law by any statutory reference in the judicial
notice section. This omission is in accord with a recommendation in a
1964 study on judicial notice which recognized legislative facts but
suggested the term not be embraced within the statute itself.0 6 The
recommendation was apparently followed because although the statute
makes no reference to legislative facts, the comment to section 450 of
the Evidence Code clearly sanctions the use of extrinsic aids in deter-
mining what the law is.'07 Since the comment acknowledges that such
102 Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 270-71 (1944).
1032 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 94, § 15.09 (1958); Davis, supra note 93,
at 948-49; Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 406 (1942).
104 REPORT OF THE NEw JERSEY SuprEmm COURT Com'rmra oi- EvIDENcE 31
(1963).
105 Id. at 32.
1066 CAuioaArA LAw REvIsioN Cowmi'N, REPORTS, REco-mENDATIONS &
Stmms 858 (1964). "In view of the difficulty of stating in statutory form the process
of taking judicial notice of "legislative facts,' coverage of such notice is wisely omitted
in the Uniform Rules. It would seem to be important, however, to disavow any intent
to disprove of or limit the principle of notice of 'legislative facts.! This could be satis-
factorily accomplished by including a statement to this effect by way of a commentary
upon Rule 9" Ibid.
107 "Under the Evidence Code, as under existing law, courts may consider what-
ever materials are appropriate in construing statutes, determining constitutional issues,
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extrinsic data may be controversial,108 this admission is a clear indica-
tion that the Evidence Code will permit courts to judicially notice dis-
putable legislative facts.
Notice to the Parties
Another important policy question relates to the necessity of a court
advising the parties when it contemplates taking judicial notice of
legislative facts. Considering that legislative facts are used not to
determine the ultimate fact between parties to a lawsuit, but primarily
as a matter of persuasion in determining the policy in a rule of law to be
adopted, it is arguable that no notice should be required. Thus, if a
court is called upon to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute,
advance notice of the use of economic or social data would not be
warranted because it is reasonable to assume that the legislature had
the benefit of the same information when it enacted the statute. In this
situation it would be immaterial that the adversary could produce con-
flicting data so long as the court determines that the legislature could
reasonably rely on the data judicially noticed by the court 0 9 Professor
Davis, who advocates a liberal use of judicial notice, agrees that
advance notice should not be required when a court intends to judi-
cially notice legislative facts.- 0
The more conservative commentators in the field of judicial notice
are of the opinion that a court should advise the parties of its intention
to judicially notice legislative facts. McCormick has suggested that any
notice requirement be based on common sense, i.e. the judge should be
vested with discretion to determine if fairness requires advance notifi-
cation."' In an appropriate case, McCormick suggests that a court
should give advance notice of its intention to judicially notice legisla-
tive facts, thus affording the parties opportunity to furnish supple-
mentary materials to assist the court."2 Professor Morgan leaves no
doubt as to his view that notice should be given:
and formulating rules of law. That a court may consider legislative history, discussions
by learned writers in treatises and law reviews, materials that contain controversial
economic and social facts or findings or that indicate contemporary opinion, and similar
materials is inherent in the requirement that it take judicial notice of the law." CArL.
EvmENcE Conn § 450, comment.
108 Ibid.
109 Currie, supra note 94, at 50-51.
110 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 94, § 15.08, at 388. Davis contends that in the great
majority of cases advance notification serves no useful purpose because ninety-nine out
of a hundred extra-record facts are so obvious that no one would conceivably want to
challenge them. Id. at 394.
"I McCon ac, EVmENcE § 330, at 708 (1954).
112 Id. at 707.
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In reading data garnered from text books and encyclopedias, and
statistics taken from specified sources, set out in an opinion of a court
of last resort, one often has a feeling that they might have been contra-
dicted or modified or explained by diligent counsel aware that the
court intended to use them. Consequently, protection to litigants
should be provided (a) by furnishing them full opportunity to be
heard in time to make their contentions effective and to make a record
which will assure review by appellate tribunals .... 11-
The United States Supreme Court frequently resorts to judicial
notice of legislative facts dehors the record in deciding constitutional
issues 114 and other questions of law involving broad policy. Many of
the recent cases indicate that the Supreme Court will take judicial
notice without giving notification to the parties." 5 Professor Davis has
commented that it would be nonsense to give advance notification of
intention to take judicial notice in these cases." 6
In the landmark case of Perez v. Sharp"17 the California Supreme
Court made extensive use of legislative facts in ruling on the consti-
tutionality of a statute that forbade miscegenous marriages. The ma-
jority opinion, in declaring the statute unconstitutional, referred to
numerous treatises and texts as supporting data for the court's hold-
ing. The concurring opinion and the dissenting opinions also made
extensive references to texts, statistical data, and other material of a
highly controversial nature." 8 While the opinions in the Perez case
11s Morgan, supra note 102, at 293.
'14 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). This case is famous for the introduction
of the celebrated Brandeis brief submitted by Attorney Louis D. Brandeis. The brief
contained references to committee reports, reports of factory inspections, and reports
of bureaus of statistics, all of which the court considered. After he became Mr. Justice
Brandeis, he continued being a great exponent of this procedure and frankly acknowl-
edged the use of extra-record materials in the form of books, articles, reports of com-
mittees, testimony before congressional committees, and many other sources in the opin-
ions he wrote. In Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924), his dissenting
opinion likewise contains dozens of references to agency reports, books, and other
material.
Some commentators refer to these facts as constitutional facts, or social facts. See
Bik16, Judicial Determinations of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity
of Legislative Action, 38 HAsv. L. REv. 6 (1924); Note, The Presentation of Facts
Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes, 49 HAnv. L. Ruv. 631 (1936); Note, Social
and Economic Facts-Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the
Courts, 61 HAnv. L. B.-v. 692 (1948).
"5 SEC v. Variable Life Ins. Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959); Territory of
Alaska v. American Can Co., 358 U.S. 224, 226 (1959).
16 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 94, § 15.08 (Supp. 1965, at 71-72). Davis has indi-
cated, however, that notification of the parties might serve a useful purpose in some
instances. Id. § 15.08, at 393.
11732 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
118 For example, there were quotations from Hitler's Mein Kampf. Id. at 739, 198
P.2d at 34.
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do not allude to the use of judicial notice, it is apparent that the
majority and the dissenting opinions used this process extensively
and did so without notification of the parties." 9
Since the Evidence Code does not specifically refer to legislative
facts, other than recognizing the use of its legislative histories, books,
treatises, economic and social data in a comment,120 it is doubtful if
there is any positive requirement of advance notification before legis-
lative facts can be judicially noticed. If the function of legislative facts
is to assist the court in determining what the law is, it can be argued
that these facts are really matters of law and should be governed by
the rules pertaining to judicial notice of law, rather than judicial notice
of fact. The most probable occasion for a California court to take judi-
cial notice of legislative facts would arise whenever it sought to ascer-
tain or formulate a rule of California law or to determine the applicable
federal law. Section 455 of the Evidence Code, which requires advance
notification and affords the parties the opportunity to present relevant
information before a court takes judicial notice, is limited to matters of
fact and law found within section 451 (f) and section 452. Since neither
California law nor the law of the United States falls within the ambit of
these sections, there appears to be no affirmative statutory requirement
of advance notice even if it involves a matter of substantial conse-
quence.
Not withstanding the absence of a legislative mandate to furnish
advance notification, what policy should the courts follow if they
intend to judicially notice legislative facts? If the vital interests of a
litigant are to be affected by the use of social or economic data, should
he not be given an opportunity to be heard and to supplement or rebut
the information acquired by the court?
The frank revelations by an eminent Wisconsin jurist'2' may be
startling to many members of the Bar who have been schooled in the
adversary system of litigation. In making determinations of rules of
law the Wisconsin Supreme Court apparently has made a practice of
seeking information from various state offices. The propriety of this
practice has been upheld by the Wisconsin court:
119 It is apparent, however, that at least some of the extra-record material was
referred to in the briefs submitted to the Court. Id. at 739, 198 P.2d at 33. It has been
pointed out that many court opinions which do make use of items of legislative history
in interpreting statutes make no reference to judicial notice and quite frequently consider
such matters without even stating the sources from which the information was obtained.
Currie, supra note 94, at 42.
120 CAr . Evnms_ cE COD § 450, comment.
1
2 1 Currie, Judicial Notice, supra note 94, at 44.
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[I]t has been the practice of the members of this court to refresh their
recollection upon matters of which courts take judicial notice, by
calling upon any department in the State Capitol for information
necessary for an intelligent understanding of matters and issues pend-
ing before the court, as well as for assistance on the part of those
familiar with voluminous records in locating matters therein con-rained.122
One commentator has indicated that a party should be given the
opportunity to present disputable legislative facts when it is in his
interest to do So.123 The suggestion has been made that such facts
could be presented to the court in the same manner as foreign law, 24
or by appointment of a referee or master to ascertain the facts.2 5
Judge Frank has suggested that, at the appellate level, courts should
not "resort to our mere unchecked surmises... 'without means of veri-
fying our conclusions.'"' In a dissenting opinion, Judge Frank criti-
cized his colleagues for taking judicial notice of certain ephemeral facts
without any basis whatsoever. The suggested solution in his dissent was
to remand to the district judge with directions to give the parties an
opportunity to present reliable information to the trial judge and place
all of the data on the record so that it could be reviewed on appeal.' 7
Social and economic data should be available to a court via judicial
notice to assist it in formulating a rule of law, even if they may be dis-
putable or controversial. Judicial notice of such data can be a valuable
adjunct in the judicial process because it promotes convenience and
saves time. One has the feeling, however, that courts should not have
an absolute unlimited hand in the use of legislative facts. The notion
that judicial notice is based primarily on convenience 28 should not
obscure the fundamental concept of fairness and procedural due
process that is inherent in our adversary system of jurisprudence.
Fairness in the application of judicial notice implies that the parties
ought to have an opportunity, in either the trial court or appellate
122 Wisconsin Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 202 Wis.
355, 371, 233 N.W. 72, 75-76 (1930). This practice on the part of the court was appar-
ently criticized by the appellant who contended that there was "a persistent rumor that
since the decision of this case an employee of the Tax Commission has been in confer-
ence with a member of this court concerning this case." Ibid.
128 Note, Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Pre-
senting Them to the Courts, 61 HAalv. L. REv. 692, 698 (1948).
124 Id. at 699.
125 Id. at 701.
126 lepouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1947) (Frank, J., dis-
senting).
127 Id. at 154-55.
1282 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 94, § 15.09 (Supp. 1965, at 76).
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court, to present information to the court or rebut authorities the court
is considering in fashioning a policy judgmenl By limiting such oppor-
tunities to submit information to matters of substantial consequence,
no attenuation in the effective use of judicial notice should be apparent.
A trial is an adversary proceeding and ascertaining or formulating
domestic law is an integral part of the adversary process. A law suit is
a search for the truth, not a game to be decided by surprise.2 9 A litigant
ought to have his day in court at every stage of the proceedings to
assist the trial or appellate court in formulating a rule of law. Professor
Currie has stated: "It is positively dangerous to entertain the notion
that judicial notice can dispense with procedures which safeguard the
fairness of the adversary process. 130
Conclusion
Properly used, judicial notice can be a valuable tool in the adversary
system for the lawyer as well as the court. Without question, the pos-
sibilities of judicial notice go unrealized in much litigation due to un-
certainty and unfamiliarity with the subject on the part of lawyers and
judges. It is also apparent that at the appellate level it is used often
without recognizing it as such and so labeling it. As indicated in this
article, much of the confusion in the past use of judicial notice may
be due to the lack of definitive procedural guides. The Evidence Code
provides clear answers to most procedural questions and should
remove much of the uncertainty surrounding the use of the doctrine.
It is reasonable to assume, and it is hopefully anticipated, that an
enlightened Bench and Bar will make greater use of judicial notice.
While more liberal use of judicial notice should be expected with
the enactment of the Evidence Code, it should be stated that neither a
trial court nor an appellate court should consider that judicial notice is
carte blanche to dispense with the production of evidence. Judici l
notice should not be taken when there is any doubt about the pro-
priety of doing so, as such action may be in derogation of the adversary
process. "It cannot perform magic, and it can easily get out of hand."181
There is too much opportunity for injustice if a court judicially notices
matters without indicating its intention to the parties and giving them
an opportunity to retort. But properly used in accordance with the
12 9 See Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 377, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90,
99, 364 P.2d 266, 275 (1961).
18 0 Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 964,
991 (1958).
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traditional notions of fairness, the doctrine of judicial notice as pro-
posed in the Evidence Code, can play a vital role in our system of
jurisprudence.
3.1 Id. at 990-91.

